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Policymakers at the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) publish macroeconomic forecasts 
since 1979. Some studies find that these forecasts do not contain useful information to predict 
these macroeconomic variables compared to other forecasts. In this paper, we examine the value 
of publishing these FOMC forecasts in two steps. We assess whether they influence private 
forecasts and whether they may be considered as a policy instrument. We provide original 
evidence that FOMC forecasts are able to influence private expectations. We also find that 
FOMC forecasts give information about future Fed rate movements, affect policy variables in a 
different way from the Fed rate, and respond differently to macro shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Two times per year since 1979 and four times per year since 2007, the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC), which consists of twelve voting members including the seven members of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve and is responsible for the implementation of US 
monetary policy, publishes macroeconomic forecasts as part of the Monetary Policy Report to 
the Congress. As these FOMC forecasts are closely monitored by the public, the purpose of this 
study is to analyze their value. 
 
Monetary policy is increasingly about managing private expectations for two reasons. First, the 
expectations channel is one of the most subtle channels of monetary policy. Indeed, changes in 
the central bank short-term interest rate affect the expectations of private agents of inflation, 
employment and growth, and such expectations then determine future realizations of these 
variables. However, the impact of monetary policy through this channel is uncertain as it 
depends on the private agents’ interpretation of interest rate variations. For instance, private 
agents may interpret that a decrease in the interest rate will lead to higher growth in the future, 
increasing their confidence to consume and invest. At the opposite, they may interpret that 
growth is weaker than expected and need the central bank to intervene, decreasing their 
confidence. The policy decisions of the central bank can therefore be understood in various ways 
and this is one reason why central banks complement their actions with communication to the 
public. King (2005) summarizes that “because inflation expectations matter to the behaviour of 
the households and firms, the critical aspect of monetary policy is how decisions of the central 
bank affect those expectations”.  
 
A second rationale for shaping private expectations is to shorten the transmission lag of 
monetary policy, given the long time lag between policy actions and their effects on the real 
economy with the traditional channels of transmission. The effectiveness of monetary policy 
thus depends on the policymakers’ ability to promptly affect private expectations.  
 
Central bank communication can take different forms (see Blinder et al. (2008) for a 
comprehensive survey): statements, minutes, interviews, or speeches. This paper focuses on a 
different way to communicate to the public in order to potentially manage private expectations: 
the publication of policymakers’ macroeconomic forecasts. The quantitative communication of 
the central bank has the advantage that its use is not based on judgmental classifications 
(content analysis, word counting, etc) and it is possible to assess its quality. We therefore 
abstract from qualitative communication and focus specifically on policymakers’ forecasts. 
 
The first question this paper assesses is whether central bank forecasts influence private ones in 
the US. Fujiwara (2005) and Ehrmann, Eijffinger and Fratzscher (2009), among others, have 
tested whether central bank forecasts or the degree of central bank transparency have an impact 
on the dispersion of private forecasts, whereas we focus on the effect of FOMC forecasts on the 
level of private forecasts. This question matters for two reasons: first, in practice, a central bank 
which is able to influence private expectations is supposed to make monetary policy 
implementation more effective. Second, in theory, Bernanke and Woodford (1997) have shown 
that a monetary policy influenced by private expectations may lead to indeterminacy, whereas 
Muto (2011) argues that when private agents follow the central bank, it must respond more 
strongly to expected inflation to achieve macroeconomic stability. Influential central bank   3
forecasts may also lead private agents to stop forming their specific information set and only 
refer to central bank information, as Morris and Shin (2002) show that there may be a crowding 
out effect of public information on independent sources of information. The ability to influence 
might then be self-sustained. Finally, Amato and Shin (2006) develop a model emphasizing that 
the central bank, as the policymaker, shapes market expectations. This paper provides original 
empirical evidence on the influencing ability of FOMC forecasts. 
 
If it turns out that FOMC forecasts influence private ones, a further question is why. Two main 
reasons may be put forward: first, central bank forecasts may have lower forecast errors than 
private ones and are therefore used by private agents to produce more accurate forecasts of the 
economic outlook. Second, central bank forecasts may convey signals of two types. FOMC 
forecasts may act as policy signals and hence be important to understand the appropriate stance 
of monetary policy (referring to the uncertainty of policy actions), to shed light on monetary 
policy preferences, strategies and objectives, and/or to extract private information. FOMC 
forecasts may also act as public signals which provide a focal point for private agents to 
coordinate when prices are strategic complements and agents seek to coordinate (Morris and 
Shin, 2002). Romer and Romer (2008) show that FOMC forecasts do not contain useful 
additional information to predict future realizations, while Gavin and Pande (2008) find 
evidence that FOMC forecasts are not more accurate than private ones. Ellison and Sargent 
(2010) argue in response to Romer and Romer (2008) that FOMC forecasts depict a worst-case 
scenario used to design robust policy decisions. Finally, Orphanides and Wieland (2008) show 
that FOMC forecasts have a predominant explanatory power for Fed rate decisions compared to 
observed economic outcomes. These four papers support the idea that FOMC forecasts may 
convey signals, and that this may be the reason for their ability to influence. 
 
The second goal of this paper is to characterize this signaling content of FOMC forecasts. How do 
FOMC forecasts work? What are their effects? To answer these questions, we test whether 
central bank forecasts enhance the implementation of usual policy actions or are another 
instrument of monetary policy. Indeed, publishing central bank forecasts may make monetary 
policy actions more effective as well as it may provide different outcomes than interest rate 
decisions do. Monetary policy instruments would be the various tools that a central bank can 
use to influence private inflation expectations, to impact some intermediate targets as money 
market and long-term interest rates, and to achieve its final objectives: stabilizing inflation and 
economic activity. Private inflation expectations are ranked first as they are important 
determinants of wage increases, future inflation as well as long-term interest rates. The response 
to this second question will then consist in assessing (a) to what extent FOMC forecasts have 
effects different from the Fed rate on private expectations, intermediate targets and final 
objectives,  (b) whether the introduction of FOMC forecasts modifies the effects of Fed rate 
actions,  (c) whether the Fed rate and FOMC forecasts are complementary, and (d) whether 
FOMC forecasts and the Fed rate respond to macroeconomic shocks in the same way.  
 
This paper is related to three strands of the existing literature. The first one deals with the 
content and the effects of the FOMC communication. Gavin (2003), Gavin and Mandal (2003), 
Gavin and Pande (2008), Capistran (2008), Tillmann (2010) and McCracken (2010) analyze the 
characteristics, biases and performances of FOMC forecasts while Meade (2005), Chappell et al. 
(2007), Meade and Stasavage (2008), Banternghansa and McCracken (2009) and Tillmann (2011) 
study the voting procedure inside the FOMC and how the preparation of and the divergence in   4
forecasts may respond to strategic behaviours. Kohn and Sack (2004), Gürkaynak, Sack and 
Swanson (2005), Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007), Rosa (2008) and Farka (2010) study how FOMC 
statements impact asset prices and long-term yields. Boukus and Rosenberg (2006) show that 
FOMC minutes also impact long-term yields. Pakko (2005) and Lucca and Trebbi (2009) assess 
the policy stance of FOMC statements. Last, Bauer et al. (2006) finds that private forecasts have 
been more synchronized since FOMC started to publish statements with Fed rate decisions, but 
that forecast errors have not become smaller since then.  
 
The second one refers to the signaling role of central bank action or communication. Geraats 
(2005) shows that the publication of central bank forecasts provides reputational signals on the 
type of central banks. Walsh (2007) analyzes the welfare effects of the publication of central bank 
forecasts and proposes optimal degrees of transparency according to demand and cost-push 
shocks. Baeriswyl and Cornand (2010) analyze how central bank actions may convey signals to 
the public and show that central banks may adjust their policy decisions in order to withhold 
some information. Empirically, the signaling role of actions has been studied by Romer and 
Romer (2000), who show that ‘‘the Federal Reserve’s actions signal its information’’ since private 
agents revise their inflation expectations in response to policy decisions. Finally, Gürkaynak, 
Sack and Swanson (2005) provide evidence that both monetary policy actions and FOMC 
statements have important and different effects on asset prices. 
 
The third one focuses on the influence of private expectations. Fujiwara (2005) shows that the 
Bank of Japan influences private forecasters while the opposite is not true. Ehrmann, Eijffinger 
and Fratzscher (2009) analyse whether central bank transparency reduces dispersion in private 
forecasts. Both analyses focus on the dispersion of forecasts. In related analyses, Levin, Natalucci 
and Piger (2004), Gürkaynak, Levin and Swanson (2010), Jansen and De Haan (2007), Cecchetti 
and Hakkio (2009) and Capistran and Ramos-Francia (2010) assess the effect of increased central 
bank communication and transparency on private expectations. Crowe (2010) evidences that 
inflation targeting adoption leads to better private forecasts. The contribution of this paper to 
the literature is to provide original evidence on the influence of FOMC forecasts on private ones. 
 
We examine whether FOMC inflation forecasts influence private ones and whether they may be 
considered as an instrument of monetary policy, using a structural VAR model with a recursive 
identification scheme. This method enables one to identify FOMC forecast shocks which would 
be independent of private inflation expectations, the Federal Reserve interest rate, inflation and 
real GDP. In addition, it enables one to assess the dynamics of such a shock in contrast to an 
event-study or a simple regression that would provide only a 1-period effect. Indeed, we are not 
only interested in the immediate influence effect but also in the dynamics of influence to 
characterize whether FOMC forecasts might be considered as a policy instrument. We therefore 
use the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) as a measure of private forecasts, and we add it 
and FOMC forecasts to a standard monetary VAR with real GDP, inflation and the Fed rate. We 
also test an alternative VAR model with SPF and FOMC forecasts, the Fed rate, the 10-year 
Treasury yields and the US 3-month LIBOR rate. The monetary policy communication shock is 
identified by assuming that policymakers immediately observe the Fed rate, long- and short-
term interest rates, inflation and real GDP. This is done to identify the monetary policy 
communication shock from other types of shocks, such as a monetary policy action shock, a 
supply shock and a demand shock. Estimates are robust to various alternative model and 
estimation specifications, as well as to different data and samples.   5
Our first set of results shows that an exogenous increase in FOMC forecasts produces a 
significant and persistent effect on private forecasts. They respond, as expected, positively on 
impact and proportionally less than the increase in FOMC forecasts. The maximum effect 
happens after four semesters while the forecasting horizon is shorter, and this suggests that it 
does not stem from forecasting accuracy but from some signaling content, i.e. information on the 
future policy path. Granger-causality Wald tests and a simple regression including the residual 
component of FOMC forecasts confirm this effect. The second set of estimates provides evidence 
that first, the effects of both FOMC forecasts and Fed rate shocks are different. In particular, 
FOMC forecasts have a positive and deferred impact on private forecasts, short- and long-term 
interest rates. Second, Fed rate shocks have the same effect whether considering FOMC forecasts 
or not. This suggests that the publication of FOMC forecasts does not change the effects of 
monetary action shocks and that FOMC forecasts are not a way of enhancing standard policy 
actions. Third, FOMC forecasts give information on the future Fed rate movements. This effect 
might be interpreted as a part of the policy signal content of the FOMC forecasts. Finally, 
responses of both FOMC forecasts and the Fed rate to macro shocks are differentiated: Fed rate 
responses are large and prompt, compared to those of FOMC forecasts.  
 
Hence, a possible interpretation of this statistical evidence may be that FOMC forecasts work as 
an instrument of monetary policymaking. In part because of the signals on the future 
“appropriate monetary policy” scenario underlying FOMC forecasts, they influence private 
expectations. However, because the effects of FOMC forecasts shocks are differentiated from 
Fed rate shocks, one may suppose that FOMC forecasts do not only contain signals on future 
Fed rate decisions, but are also an instrument which enables one to impact policy variables in an 
other way. The fact that FOMC forecasts do not modify the effects of Fed rate shocks supports 
this view. Moreover, it is particularly interesting to note that FOMC forecasts and the Fed rate 
do not respond in the same way to macro shocks. These outcomes suggest that FOMC forecasts 
may be an instrument a priori, designed to implement policy about the long-run trend, whereas 
the Fed rate is more an instrument a posteriori responding to short-run cycles. 
 
By contrast with Fed actions (through the federal funds rate, reserve requirements, the Term 
Deposit Facility –TDF– or the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility –TALF–) which have a 
mechanical effect on their respective policy-objective variables, the effects of the communication 
instrument are not restrictive and would go through the credibility of the central bank. The 
channel of transmission of communication is not binding and this is the fundamental difference 
with actions. If some announcement is credible, it might not need action to be effective: a 
credible communication may result in changes in private expectations and private decisions 
which make future central bank action unnecessary, or which at least require smaller action than 
needed without communication. Central bank forecasts appear to be an instrument without 
having the mechanical and binding effects of the Fed rate, the main policy instrument. The 
statistical results presented in this paper do not establish that this interpretation is right, 
however evidence of the influence of FOMC forecasts on private ones as well as their effect on 
some policy variables and their response to macro shocks in contrast to the Fed rate support the 
hypothesis that central bank forecasts may be an instrument of monetary policy. 
 
This outcome would have some policy implications for central bankers. They may use their 
forecasts as an instrument of monetary policy, in addition to and complementarily with the 
central bank interest rate. This would give another string to policymakers’ bow when pursuing   6
multiple objectives, and especially when the interest rate is at the zero lower bound and 
policymakers need another instrument to take over. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and section 3 details the 
structural VAR model used. In sections 4 and 5, we respectively ask whether FOMC forecasts 
influence private ones and whether FOMC forecasts may be considered as an instrument of 




Since 1979, the Federal Reserve has reported forecasts for key macroeconomic variables – 
inflation, real growth, and unemployment – twice each year1 in the Monetary Policy Report to 
the Congress. It contains two ranges encompassing the forecasts of each individual member of 
the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC): the “full range” includes the highest and the 
lowest forecasts while the “central tendency” removes the three highest and three lowest 
forecasts. The standard approach in the literature is to consider the midpoint of those ranges to 
characterize the FOMC forecast. As a benchmark for this analysis, we use the midpoint of the 
central tendency following the result by McCracken (2010) for inflation and provide sensitivity 
tests with the midpoint of the full range. FOMC inflation forecasts are published each year in 
February and July, and are made of fourth quarter over fourth quarter growth rates. Those of 
February are for the current year and those of July are for both the current year and the next 
year. For sake of consistency of the sample and for comparison purpose with SPF forecasts, the 
focus is on the current year forecasts. Finally, it has to be noted that the variables forecasted 
have changed over time. Different measures of inflation have been forecasted by the 
policymakers: the implicit GNP price deflator until the end of July 1988, the CPI between 
February 1989 and July 1999, the chain-type price index for personal consumption expenditures 
(PCE) between February 2000 and February 2004, and the core PCE since then. Finally, it is 
worth noting that these forecasts are conditioned on FOMC members’ assessment of 
“appropriate monetary policy” which corresponds to the future interest rate path that best 
satisfies the Fed's dual objectives of maximum employment and price stability. 
 
The Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) was first compiled by the American Statistical 
Association and the National Bureau of Economic Research since 1968, and then it has been 
published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Surveys are sent to panelists at the end 
of the first month of the quarter, the deadline for submission is the second week of the second 
month of the quarter and at the end, forecasts are published between middle to late February, 
May, August, and November. They are annualized quarter-over-quarter growth rates for the 
current quarter and the next four quarters for the GDP price index; a fourth-quarter-over-fourth-
quarter forecast is then constructed to match FOMC data. Consumer price index (CPI) and core 
PCE forecasts are already provided on the basis of fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter percent 
changes. Finally, we consider the median of the individual responses as the SPF forecast. 
 
One issue arises when matching these data sets. The exact variables forecasted to capture 
inflation have changed over time and are not necessarily available at the same date for the two 
actors. Indeed, SPF has only started to forecast core PCE in 2007 and never forecasted PCE. 
                                                 
1 Since October 2007, the publication of FOMC forecasts is quarterly and the horizon extended by one additional year.   7
There is therefore no exact match between 2000 and 2006. Our benchmark approach is to 
continue to consider CPI forecasts during this period until SPF starts forecasting core PCE. We 
assess the robustness of this choice first by using the GDP deflator forecasts during the period of 
mismatch and second by focusing on a sub-sample ending in 2000 for which the match is 
perfect. Figure 1 shows the different measures of inflation forecasted and documents that there 
is no jump when variables change. Besides, Gavin and Pande (2008) note that there is no 
difference in the accuracy of FOMC inflation forecasts when variables change. 
 
The actual variables considered here come from the Real-Time Data Set of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Philadelphia. We use the second release data, which are the vintage data published the 
next quarter. Since FOMC forecasts are released to the public only twice a year, the frequency of 
the overall dataset is biannual. Because these actual data are not in biannual frequency, we face 
a dilemma: we can use the value of the month or quarter corresponding to the publication of 
forecasts, or use the average of the 6 months (in our case, Q4 and Q1 for February forecasts, and 
Q2 and Q3 for the July/August forecasts). Both solutions have advantages and drawbacks. The 
first one respects the timing of information publication but do not take into account some 
information in each semester, whereas the second one considers all information of the semester 
by averaging it but do not correspond to the information set at the time of the publication. We 
decide to focus on the first method and provide robustness tests for the second one. We 
therefore consider the first and third quarters for real GDP and inflation2 (i.e. GNP/GDP price 
deflator, CPI and core PCE) and the values of February and August for the Federal funds target 
rate, the US 3-month LIBOR rate and the 10-year Treasury bonds rate to match the schedule of 
publication of FOMC forecasts. Real GDP and inflation are included in the analysis as year-over-
year growth rates as for SPF and FOMC forecasts. In addition, we also consider final data 
obtained from FRED database for these variables. The overall biannual data set thus starts in 
1979.2, ends in 2010.2, and comprises 63 observations. 
 
3. Structural VAR Model 
 
In order to assess first whether FOMC forecasts influence SPF ones and second whether FOMC 
forecasts are an additional instrument of monetary policy, we use a structural VAR model for 
decomposing FOMC forecasts into mutually orthogonal components with a structural economic 
interpretation. The methodology consists of augmenting a standard VAR for monetary policy 
analysis including real GDP growth, inflation and the central bank interest rate with FOMC and 
SPF forecasts. Initially, the objective is to identify an exogenous shock on the FOMC forecast 
which might be interpreted as a signal sent by the FOMC policymakers and to assess its effect 
on SPF forecasts. Second, the objective is to assess the effect of FOMC forecasts on the final 
objective variables of monetary policy – inflation and real GDP – and on some intermediate 
targets – short- and long-term interest rates – and to characterize the interaction of the action 
instrument: the Fed rate with the communication tool: the FOMC forecast. 
 
Let Zt represent the (k  x 1 ) vector that contains our k variables of interest at date t. In the 
benchmark specification, Zt = [Real GDP, Inflation, SPF, Fed rate, FOMC]’. The regression of Zt 
on its own lags p produces the reduced-form VAR errors et:  
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The recursive identification assumption postulates that the structural errors are independent 
and that A is lower triangular. This means that the covariance between the reduced-form errors 
is attributed to the structural error of the variable ordered previously in the vector Zt. Thus, the 
structural error is uncorrelated by construction to the reduced-form errors of the preceding 
variables.  
 
The recursive identification assumption depends on the ordering of the variables in the vector 
Zt. Thus, shifts in the real GDP, inflation, SPF forecasts or the Fed rate result in a 
contemporaneous change in the FOMC forecasts. At the opposite, real GDP is assumed not to 
respond to shocks in the other variables instantaneously. This restriction seems plausible as the 
transmission lags to the real economy are slow. Usually, the literature ranks the monetary policy 
instrument last in the vector of variables. We thus assume that both potential instruments react 
to other variables contemporaneously. Concerning the relative position of FOMC forecasts and 
the Fed rate, we suppose that if there is an exogenous shock on the Fed rate, FOMC forecasts 
would react contemporaneously as policy decisions are set according to FOMC forecasts. This 
implies that the Fed rate would respond with a lag to an exogenous shock to FOMC forecasts. 
Two arguments may support this hypothesis: first, the Fed rate exhibits a strong inertia, and 
second, policymakers often communicate on their future policy decisions and prepare market 
participants. Finally, we suppose SPF forecasts respond with a lag to both instruments, but 
contemporaneously to changes in inflation and real GDP. The fact that surveys take time to be 
collected from panellists and aggregated is a first argument in that direction. A second one 
refers to Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2008, 2010) and Andrade and LeBihan (2010) who 
document that private forecasters are subject to rational inattention and sticky information. This 
implies that the Fed reacts contemporaneously to private expectations and is consistent with the 
fact that it continuously gathers information on private expectations through surveys or 
financial markets. This benchmark ordering seems to be the most relevant one. However, in 
order to test the sensitivity of the results and the contribution of these assumptions to them, 
several orderings are tested and compared.  
 
In addition to this benchmark VAR with final objectives variables, we test an alternative VAR 
model with two intermediate targets instead of inflation and real GDP. We introduce the US 3-
month LIBOR rate and the 10-year Treasury bonds rate. The benchmark ordering for this 
alternative VAR is [SPF, 10y rate, LIBOR rate, Fed rate, FOMC]. We assume that all 3 interest   9
rates and the FOMC forecast respond contemporaneously to changes in the SPF forecasts. Once 
again, in order to assess the robustness of our estimations, we proceed to various orderings. 
Table 1 lists all orderings tested3. 
 
The structural VAR analysis is performed with 2 lags. The final prediction error (FPE) and the 
Akaike information criterion (AIC) suggest 2 lags, while the Schwarz Bayesian information 
criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan and Quinn information criterion (HQIC) propose 1 lag. The 
validity of benchmark estimates is therefore tested with 1 lag. We also checked the eigenvalue 
stability condition of our VAR estimates, since impulse–response functions and forecast-error 
variance decompositions require the VAR to be stable to be interpreted. In the present case, all 
the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle, so our VAR satisfies the stability condition. 
 
4. Do FOMC forecasts influence SPF forecasts? 
 
The purpose of this section is to assess whether FOMC forecasts influence SPF ones. Using our 
benchmark VAR model, we test the hypothesis that a FOMC forecast shock has an effect on 
private forecasts. One step further is to test whether an increase of FOMC forecast yields to an 
increase in SPF forecasts with an elasticity inferior to one. Indeed, a decrease of SPF forecasts 
after a positive FOMC forecasts shock would imply that the Fed is exceptionally credible and 
policy actions are not necessary, and hence seems not realistic; or that the Fed is not credible at 
all. At the opposite, an increase of SPF forecasts superior to the increase of FOMC forecasts 
would imply that the Fed has a low credibility for stabilizing inflation, would render its task 
more difficult, and would not justify that it publishes its forecasts. 
 
Figure 2 plots the impulse response of SPF forecasts to a FOMC forecast one standard deviation 
(S.D.) innovation. It causes a significant increase in SPF forecasts with a maximum magnitude of 
0.17 percentage point after three and four semesters. In more general economic terms, it 
corresponds to a 0.68 percentage point increase in SPF forecasts after a 1-percentage point 
increase in FOMC forecasts. This result suggests that the FOMC forecasts have some influential 
power on SPF forecasts, and this estimate of influence is consistent with monetary theory and 
practice since the elasticity is inferior to one. The fact that this effect happens after four 
semesters, so after the forecasting horizon, also suggests that the device at work is not linked to 
the forecast accuracy. Interestingly, this horizon corresponds to the delays of transmission of 
monetary policy and would suggest that the influencing ability might be due to some signaling 
effect, in part on the future “appropriate monetary policy” and so the future interest rate path. 
 
Table 2 contains the variance decomposition result of SPF forecasts in order to distinguish the 
contribution of the FOMC forecast shock to the total variance of private forecasts. It follows that 
the communication shock has an effect on SPF of 10.2 percent, while past SPF and inflation 
explain respectively 51.2 and 29 percent of the variance of SPF. We also observe that the Fed rate 
shock has no effect on SPF forecasts (0.7 percent). 
 
Table 3 presents Granger-causality Wald tests between SPF and FOMC forecasts. The Wald test 
investigates whether the coefficients on the two lags of FOMC forecasts which appear in the SPF 
equation are jointly zero. The null hypothesis that FOMC forecasts do not Granger-cause SPF 
                                                 
3 In addition, placing real GDP or inflation last in the vector Zt has also been tested and do not affect the results.   10
forecasts is strongly rejected. At the opposite, the null hypothesis that SPF forecasts do not 
Granger-cause FOMC forecasts cannot be rejected. Given the strong correlation between these 
two series of forecasts, the fact that FOMC forecasts are strongly significant to determine SPF 
forecasts whereas the opposite is not true is very striking. This evidence suggests that FOMC 
forecasts influence SPF ones, but that SPF ones do not influence FOMC ones. 
 
Table 4 provides another complementary set of estimates. FOMC forecasts are regressed on one 
lag of the SPF forecast, the Fed rate, the inflation rate, real GDP, the long-term rate, the LIBOR 
rate, the FOMC forecasts and a variable comprising the set of macroeconomic news4 released 
between t and t-1. The residuals which one might reasonably assume that they represent a series 
of FOMC forecast shocks is then used along with the above-included regressors to determine 
SPF forecasts. Estimates show that the FOMC forecasts or their residual component are always 
very significant in determining SPF forecasts regardless of the timing assumptions considered.  
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The approach to estimate the effect of FOMC forecasts structural shocks on SPF relies on 
restrictions and hypotheses that seem reasonable, but requires assessing whether the main result 
holds with different hypotheses. We thus provide information on the robustness of this result. 
Two series of tests are conducted related to model and estimation specifications, and to the data. 
 
Concerning the estimation procedure, the first test consists of providing the impulse responses 
of SPF forecasts to a FOMC forecast shock with different orderings than the benchmark one (see 
Figure 3.1). The same exercise is done for the contribution of FOMC forecasts to the variance 
decomposition of SPF forecasts (Table 2). As a second test, we estimate a reduced-form VAR 
with the same variables in the vector Zt and plot the equivalent impulse response (Figure 3.2). 
Indeed, imposing some restrictions on the structure of the error variance-covariance matrix 
enables one to make a causal interpretation of the results. However, estimating a reduced-form 
VAR allows data to speak without questionable assumptions. Third, the impact of the number of 
lags is evaluated (Figure 3.3). Finally, because the number of observations may be considered 
small, the variance-covariance matrix is estimated with a small-sample degrees-of-freedom 
adjustment: the small-sample divisor used is 1/(T-m) instead of the maximum likelihood divisor 
1/T, T being the sample size and m the average number of parameters in each of the equations 
(Figure 3.4). It is also worth noting that since small samples produce greater standard errors, the 
related potential bias would go against the hypothesis that FOMC forecasts influence private 
ones. Significant estimates would therefore be all the more so convincing. 
 
Concerning the data, the first test consists of replacing the midpoint of the central tendency by 
the midpoint of the full range as the FOMC forecast and plotting the impulse response of SPF 
forecasts following a FOMC forecast shock (Figure 4.1). We then estimate the benchmark VAR 
with the SPF forecasts of the GDP price deflator rather than those of the CPI during the period of 
time when there is a mismatch between SPF and FOMC forecasts. We also estimate the 
benchmark VAR on a subsample ending in 2000 (Figure 4.2). We then test whether FOMC 
forecasts still influence SPF forecasts when using real GDP forecasts (Figure 4.3). We also 
consider the use of final data rather than real-time data for inflation and real GDP, and finally, 
                                                 
4 Following the news and announcement literature (see Andersen et al. 2003), we construct the news variable by 
deducting the forecast of a given variable (inflation) in t-1 from the actual value of the given variable in t.   11
replace the value of the specific month or quarter considered for each semester by the average of 
the whole semester data (Figure 4.4). 
 
All the tests5 performed confirm the robustness of the baseline result that FOMC forecasts 
influence SPF ones and even reinforce the scope of this baseline result, to the extent that the 
baseline result appears to be the lower bound of the range of estimates. The response of SPF 
forecasts to a FOMC forecast shock is either similar or superior to the baseline result. 
Interestingly, the effects when considering the midpoint of the full range or the midpoint of the 
central tendency are alike while McCracken (2010) documents that full range inflation forecasts 
are subject to strategic behaviour by the individual FOMC members and so to some noise. Their 
lower accuracy does not mean that they do not influence private forecasts. 
 
Discussion 
It appears that FOMC forecasts are able to influence private forecasts. The positive and less than 
proportional effect on private expectations suggests that the quantitative communication policy 
of the FOMC is not irrational and enables it to shape private expectations. Two possible sources 
of this influence are that first, central bank forecasts may have lower forecast errors than private 
ones and are therefore used by private agents to produce more accurate forecasts of the future 
economic outlook; second, central bank forecasts may convey signals: on policymakers’ 
preferences or objectives, on their private information on the long-run equilibrium trend or the 
potential of the economy, on their future “appropriate monetary policy” decisions or strategies. 
Romer and Romer (2008) and Gavin and Pande (2008) shed some light on this issue, and show 
that FOMC forecasts have no useful predictive power and are not more accurate than private 
forecasts. These results support the second source of influence: the signals content of FOMC 
forecasts. In addition, it is worth noting that two interpretations of the positive but less than 
proportional coefficient are possible: the Fed may expect an increase in inflation and 
communicates on it. If the Fed is credible, private agents will expect a rise in the Fed rate and 
then forecast a smaller than communicated increase in inflation. The Fed would have succeeded 
to prevent a part of the increase of inflation by communicating on it. At the opposite, one may 
argue that the Fed creates self-fulfilling prophecies by communicating on inflation. By 
influencing private expectations which are the main determinants of future realized inflation, 
the Fed somewhat set in part the future inflation rate. Signaling may therefore be interpreted in 
two different ways. To conclude this section, regardless of the source of this influence of central 
bank forecasts on private expectations and of the potential use made by policymakers of their 
forecasts, estimates provide empirical support for the wide theoretical literature which states 
that monetary policy is about managing private expectations. 
 
5. Are FOMC forecasts an instrument of monetary policy? 
 
The second question of this paper follows from the evidence of the preceding section and of 
Romer and Romer (2008) and Gavin and Pande (2008). Since FOMC forecasts influence SPF ones 
and FOMC forecasts are not more accurate, one natural hypothesis is to suppose that FOMC 
forecasts are influential because of some signal content. A further step is then to assess whether 
                                                 
5 We also assessed the robustness of the Granger-causality Wald tests with similar robustness tests (see Table 3) and 
added a test in which we deliberately put FOMC forecasts in a situation of timing disadvantage by considering only 
the forecasts of the third quarter which are published in July (FOMC) and August (SPF).   12
the publication of central bank forecasts may be c o n s i d e r e d  a s  a n  i n s t r u m e n t  o f  m o n e t a r y  
policy6. In other words, how do policy signals work? What are the effects of FOMC forecasts on 
policy variables? How do FOMC forecasts interact with the main instrument of the Fed? 
 
In order to shed light on these questions, we assess whether central bank forecasts are an 
improved means of implementing standard policy actions or another instrument of monetary 
policy. We consider four hypotheses: (a) a FOMC forecast shock has the same effects than a Fed 
rate shock, (b) the introduction of FOMC forecasts modifies the effects of a Fed rate shock, (c) a 
Fed rate shock has an impact on FOMC forecasts and vice-versa, and (d) the Fed rate and FOMC 
forecasts respond to exogenous macroeconomic shocks in the same way.  
 
We start with the hypothesis (a) and assess whether a FOMC forecast shock has differentiated 
effects on intermediate targets and objective variables. Figure 5 plots the impulse response of 
inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts to both Fed rate and FOMC forecast shocks based on the 
benchmark VAR specification. There are two differences between both monetary shocks: for 
inflation and SPF forecasts. The “price puzzle” – the fact that inflation increases in response to a 
monetary contraction in a simple VAR – disappears while the FOMC forecast shock has a 
positive effect on inflation of 0.20 percentage point, which corresponds to an increase of 0.80 
percentage point after a 1-percentage point increase in FOMC forecasts. In the same time, the 
Fed rate shock has no effect on SPF forecasts while the FOMC forecast shock has an impact of 
0.17 percentage point after four periods (as seen in the preceding section).  
 
Figure 6 plots the impulse response of long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-
month LIBOR) interest rates and SPF forecasts to both Fed rate and FOMC forecast shocks based 
on the alternative VAR model. The Fed rate shock has no impact on long-term rates and SPF 
forecasts while the FOMC forecast shock increases long-term rates by 0.2 percentage point (0.8 
after a 1-percentage point shock) and SPF forecasts by 0.15 percentage point (0.60 after a 1-
percentage point shock) after four periods. The response of the LIBOR rates is even more 
interesting: the Fed rate has a positive effect of 0.33 percentage point (0.92 percentage point after 
a 1-percentage point increase in the Fed rate) only the period next to the shock while the FOMC 
forecast shock has an effect of 0.31 percentage point (1.24 percentage point after a 1-percentage 
point increase in FOMC forecasts) but after 4 to 5 periods. It is particularly striking to note that 
FOMC forecasts produce such a deferred impact which is another distinction with the Fed rate. 
 
Table 5 contains the contribution of both policy tools to the variance decomposition of all three 
policy variables for both the objective variables VAR and the intermediate targets VAR. It 
follows that the communication shock has a higher effect on SPF forecasts than the monetary 
action shock: 10.2 versus 0.7 percent and 8.1 versus 2.4 percent for respectively both VARs. 
 
Concerning the hypothesis (b), figures 7 and 8 show respectively the responses of inflation, real 
GDP and SPF forecasts, and long-term and short-term rates and SPF forecasts to a Fed rate shock 
when including or excluding the FOMC forecasts from the VAR. If the FOMC forecasts were an 
improving means to implement the usual policy actions, to the extent that it makes those policy 
actions more effective, including the FOMC forecasts in the VAR should make the responses of 
                                                 
6 This question is close but differs from the one of Ellison and Sargent (2010). Their analysis proposes to reconcile the 
fact that FOMC policymakers can be bad forecasters and good policymakers. In the present paper, we abstract from 
the question of the forecasting performance and assess whether FOMC forecasts may be used for policymaking.   13
objective variables, intermediate targets and private expectations different and would then 
provide an estimate of the effect of policymakers’ forecasts to enhance policy actions. The 
evidence points out that the introduction of FOMC forecasts does not produce differentiated 
effects of a Fed rate shock, and suggests that publishing FOMC forecasts is not an enhanced way 
to implement monetary policy. It rather supports the view that publishing FOMC forecasts 
strives to another objective and that they may act as a different policy instrument. 
 
Figure 9 deals with the hypothesis (c) and plots the response of FOMC forecasts and the Fed rate 
to a Fed rate and a FOMC forecast shock using the benchmark and the alternative VARs. If each 
monetary instrument responds by a one-to-one variation to an innovation in the other one, both 
instruments may be considered as perfectly dependant. At the extreme opposite, they may be 
considered as independent. Between both, some cross-effect of one on the other would evidence 
some complementary between these two instruments. It appears that FOMC forecasts react only 
during 1 period to a Fed rate shock and seem independent afterwards, whereas a FOMC forecast 
shock calls for an increase of the Fed rate 0.34 percentage point (1.36 percentage point after a 1-
percentage point innovation in FOMC forecasts) around 4 to 6 periods ahead. This effect might 
be interpreted as a part of the policy signal content of FOMC forecasts and would be consistent 
with the argument that policymakers reveal in part the future “appropriate monetary policy” 
when publishing the FOMC forecasts. 
 
Concerning the hypothesis (d), figures 10 and 11 plot the Fed rate and FOMC forecasts responses 
to innovations in respectively inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, and long-term rates, LIBOR 
rates and SPF forecasts. As expected, an increase in inflation, real GDP or inflation expectations 
leads to a monetary contraction. The general pattern of these estimates is that both variables do 
not respond the same way: Fed rate responses are large and prompt, compared to those of 
FOMC forecasts.  
 
Table 6 presents the variance decomposition of both instruments. Based on the objective 
variables VAR, real GDP and SPF forecasts account for respectively 41 and 9 percent of the 
variance of the Fed rate, while SPF forecasts and inflation account for respectively 37 and 16 
percent of the variance of the FOMC forecasts. Using the intermediate targets VAR, SPF 
forecasts, long-term and short-term rates account for respectively 30, 15 and 39 percent of the 
variance of the Fed rate, while the SPF forecasts account for 61 percent of the variance of the 
FOMC forecasts. Whereas the effect of Fed rate shocks on the macroeconomic variables is small, 
the policy interest rate variations result from these variables. FOMC forecasts are mainly driven 
by inflation and inflation expectations. 
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
The robustness of the preceding results is assessed with the same tests than those employed in 
the preceding section. Estimates are presented in the Appendix. Figures A.1 to A.3, respectively 
for the objective variable VAR, the intermediate targets VAR and the cross-effects of 
instruments, assess the sensitivity of the baseline results to various orderings. Figures A.4 to A.6 
focus on the comparison of responses obtained with structural and reduced-form VARs. Figures 
A.7 to A.9 plot the responses stemming from the VAR specifications with 1 lag only. Figures 
A.10 to A.12 are drawn based on the use of a small-sample estimator. Figures A.13 to A.15 show 
the different responses when considering the midpoint of the full range rather than of the 
central tendency for the FOMC forecasts. Figures A.16 to A.18 make use of real GDP forecasts of   14
both FOMC and SPF. Figure A.19 is built with final data for real GDP and inflation. Figures A.20 
to A.22 provide estimates with semester average data.7 
 
All those tests provide confirmations that the baseline estimates are robust, except for the use of 
the midpoint of the full range of individual FOMC members’ forecasts for which evidence is 
sometimes smaller. This may be explained by the strategic behavior of the individual FOMC 
members as explained by McCracken (2010) or Tillmann (2011). Policymakers with extreme 
preferences will construct their forecasts to drive the preferred policy that they would like to see 
implemented. This is why removing the highest three and lowest three forecasts constitutes a 
forecast more representative of the consensus of the individual FOMC members. It suggests that 
FOMC forecasts may be more effective as an instrument of monetary policy when they are not 
subject to strategic considerations between individual FOMC members, but represent the 
consensus on the policy that will be implemented. An additional comment emerges for real GDP 
forecasts: it is interesting to note that FOMC forecasts still influence SPF forecasts and macro 
variables, and that a positive shock on FOMC forecasts leads in the next two periods to a 
decrease of the Fed rate. Once again, FOMC forecasts seem to convey a signal on the future 
“appropriate monetary policy” and how to interpret the increase in FOMC forecasts.  
 
Discussion 
The estimates from the four tests suggest that FOMC forecasts may be considered as an 
instrument of monetary policymaking. First, it appears that action and communication produce 
different effects: FOMC forecasts impact private forecasts, short- and long-term interest rates. 
This result is consistent with Gürkaynak, Sack and Swanson (2005). They show that a large 
portion of variation in long-term yields is due to FOMC communication rather Fed rate changes. 
Moreover, the effects of FOMC forecasts are deferred compared to the Fed rate. FOMC forecasts 
might therefore be used by policymakers to reach different objectives and follow a different 
strategy. Second, it seems that the publication of FOMC forecasts is not an improved way of 
implementing policy actions. The fact that the effects of a Fed rate shock are not modified by the 
disclosure of FOMC forecasts suggests that the communication of central bank forecasts has its 
own rationale. Third, it appears that FOMC forecasts give information on future Fed rate 
movements and the future “appropriate monetary policy”, and this may be interpreted as a part 
of the signal content of the FOMC forecasts. This is consistent with previous studies. Gürkaynak, 
Sack and Swanson (2005) find that FOMC statements are closely associated with the future path 
of policy decisions in contrast to the current Fed rate. Swanson (2006) shows that US financial 
markets and private forecasters have a better picture of the future Fed rate and have become less 
surprised by Fed decisions since the FOMC enhanced its communication policy, while 
Orphanides and Wieland (2008) evidence that Fed rate decisions can be explained by FOMC 
forecasts8. Thus, FOMC forecasts might be seen as a n  i n s t r u m e n t  t o  s i g n a l  f u t u r e  p o l i c y  
decisions or policymakers’ preferences. Fourth, responses of both the Fed rate and FOMC 
forecasts to macro shocks are different: the Fed rate responds promptly and with more 
magnitude. This suggest that whereas FOMC forecasts are a instrument a priori designed to 
implement policy about the long-run trend, the Fed rate is more an instrument a posteriori 
                                                 
7 Robustness analyses are not provided in the Appendix for the following tests: Including/Excluding FOMC forecasts 
and Responses to macro shocks. These tests are in line with the other robustness tests and confirm the baseline results. 
They are available from the author upon request. 
8 Hayo and Neuenkirch (2010) find a similar result with a communication indicator encompassing speeches of Fed’s 
governors and regional presidents.   15
responding to short-run cycles. This is consistent with the deferred impact of FOMC forecasts 
and the signal on future Fed rate decisions. All in all, it appears that FOMC forecasts are able to 
shape private expectations, to impact policy variables and to signal future policy actions; hence 





In this paper, we examine the value of the FOMC forecasts in two ways. We assess whether they 
influence private forecasts and whether they may be considered as an instrument of monetary 
policy. We provide original evidence that FOMC forecasts are able to influence private ones. The 
second set of estimates provides evidence that the effects of both FOMC forecasts and Fed rate 
shocks are differentiated. In particular, FOMC forecasts have a positive and deferred impact on 
private forecasts, short- and long-term interest rates. The publication of FOMC forecasts does 
not change the effects of Fed rate shocks and it suggests that FOMC forecasts do not enhance the 
implementation of standard policy actions. However, FOMC forecasts give information on the 
future Fed rate movements. Finally, responses of both FOMC forecasts and the Fed rate to macro 
shocks are differentiated: Fed rate responses are large and prompt.  
 
Hence, a possible interpretation of this statistical evidence may be that FOMC forecasts work as 
an instrument of monetary policymaking. In part because of the signals on future Fed rate 
movements and the future “appropriate monetary policy”, FOMC forecasts influence the 
formation of private expectations. However, because the effects of FOMC forecasts shocks are 
different from Fed rate shocks, one may suppose that FOMC forecasts do not only contain 
signals on future Fed rate decisions, but are also a different policy instrument. The fact that 
FOMC forecasts do not modify the effects of Fed rate shocks and FOMC forecasts and the Fed 
rate respond differently to macro shocks supports this view. It suggests that FOMC forecasts are 
an instrument a priori designed to implement policy about the long-run trend, whereas the Fed 
rate is more an instrument a posteriori responding to short-run cycles. Based on the credibility of 
the central bank, policymakers’ forecasts thus seem to be another instrument without owning 
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Table 2 – Variance Decomposition of SPF 
Benchmark VAR model 
Contribution of:    Real GDP Inflation SPF Fed  rate  FOMC   
Average  of  10  periods    0.090 0.290 0.512 0.007 0.102   
Contribution of the FOMC Monetary Shock 
   Benchmark  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4  Model 5  Model 6  Model 7 




Table 3 - Granger causality Wald tests – Benchmark VAR 
Equation  Variable  chi2  df  Prob > chi2 
SPF FOMC  9.692  2  0.008 
FOMC SPF  0.441  2  0.802 
    VAR with 1 lag 
SPF FOMC  13.552  1  0.000 
FOMC SPF  1.671  1  0.196 
   Small  sample  estimator 
SPF FOMC  7.945  2  0.019 
FOMC SPF  0.361  2  0.835 
    VAR with FOMC_FR 
SPF FOMC  8.364  2  0.015 
FOMC SPF  2.049  2  0.359 
    Only Q3: FOMC Timing Disad. 
SPF FOMC  2.588  2  0.095 
FOMC SPF  0.407  2  0.670 
   19
Table 4 – OLS regressions 
[1] [2] [3]  SPFt 
Coef. SE Coef. SE Coef. SE 
SPFt-1  0.656*** (0.108)  -0.093  (0.220) 0.397*** (0.114) 
FOMCt-1        0.697***  (0.169)     
resid FOMCt  0.799*** (0.126)         0.705***  (0.124) 
Fed ratet-1  0.082 (0.125) -0.017 (0.147)     
Fed ratet              -0.086  (0.116) 
Inflationt-1  0.070 (0.105) 0.164 (0.123)     
Inflationt              0.324***  (0.095) 
Real GDPt-1  -0.018 (0.036) -0.024 (0.041)     
Real GDPt              -0.078**  (0.036) 
LT ratest-1  0.145 (0.067) 0.186 (0.078)     
LT ratest              0.183***  (0.063) 
LIBOR ratest-1  -0.095 (0.134) -0.081 (0.155)     
LIBOR ratest              0.029  (0.126) 
Newst-1↔t  0.566*** (0.150) 0.605*** (0.173) 0.332** (0.134) 
Constant  0.126 (0.232) 0.326 (0.271) 0.234 (0.219) 
R2  0.95 0.93 0.96 
***, **, * denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. The variable resid FOMC corresponds to the residuals 
obtained from the regression of FOMC forecasts on one lag of the SPF forecast, the Fed rate, the inflation rate, real 
GDP, the long-term rate, the LIBOR rate, the FOMC forecasts and a variable comprising the set of macroeconomic 




Table 5 - Contribution of the FOMC and the Fed rate shocks 
Variance decomposition of the Objectives variables 
 Real  GDP  Inflation  SPF 
  FOMC  Fed rate FOMC  Fed rate FOMC  Fed rate 
Average of 10 periods  0.011 0.009 0.043 0.026 0.102 0.007 
Variance decomposition of the Intermediate targets 
  Long-term rates  LIBOR rates  SPF 
  FOMC  Fed rate FOMC  Fed rate FOMC  Fed rate 




Table 6 - Variance decomposition and Contribution of both Instruments 
Objective VAR  Real GDP  Inflation  SPF  Fed rate  FOMC 
Variance of:  FOMC  Fed rate  FOMC Fed rate FOMC Fed rate FOMC Fed rate  FOMC Fed rate
Average of 10 periods  0.126 0.408 0.157 0.086 0.367 0.153 0.038 0.305 0.311 0.048 
Targets VAR  SPF  Long-term rates LIBOR rates  Fed rate  FOMC 
Variance of:  FOMC  Fed rate  FOMC Fed rate FOMC Fed rate FOMC Fed rate  FOMC Fed rate
Average of 10 periods  0.613 0.296 0.010 0.154 0.022 0.387 0.050 0.104 0.304 0.059 
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Note: Forecasts are fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates. The y-axis is in percent. 
SPF_PGDP is the SPF forecast for the GDP price deflator, and FOMC_CT the mid-point of the central 
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Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in SPF forecasts, in response to a 
one-S.D. innovation in the FOMC forecast.   21
Figure 3 – Response of SPF forecasts to a FOMC forecast shock 
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Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR and 
models 2-7. The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The blue line is for benchmark 
VAR, maroon for model 2, green for model 3, orange for 
model 4, grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold for 
model 7. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in SPF forecasts, in response to 
a one-S.D. innovation in the FOMC forecast. 
Note: Estimates based on the benchmark structural VAR 
(blue line). The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The red line represents the SPF 
response based on the reduced-form VAR and the dash-
dotted lines the associated 90% confidence intervals. The 
impulse response corresponds to the percentage point 
change in SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. 
innovation in the FOMC forecast. 
 



















Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR and 
models 2-7. The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The blue line is for benchmark 
VAR, maroon for model 2, green for model 3, orange 
for model 4, grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold 
for model 7. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in SPF forecasts, in response 
to a one-S.D. innovation in the FOMC forecast. 
Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR and 
models 2-7. The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The blue line is for benchmark 
VAR, maroon for model 2, green for model 3, orange for 
model 4, grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold for 
model 7. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in SPF forecasts, in response to 
a one-S.D. innovation in the FOMC forecast.   22
Figure 4 – Response of SPF forecasts to a FOMC forecast shock 



















Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR with the 
mid-point of the central tendency (blue line). The dotted 
lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The red 
line represents the SPF response based on the 
benchmark VAR with the mid-point of the full range 
and the dash-dotted lines the associated 90% confidence 
intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in SPF forecasts, in response to 
a one-S.D. innovation in the FOMC forecast. 
 
Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR with the 
SPF forecasts of the GDP price deflator rather than those 
of the CPI during 2000-2006 period (blue line). The 
dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The 
red line represents the SPF response based on the 
benchmark VAR ending in 2000 and the dash-dotted 
lines the associated 90% confidence intervals. The 
impulse response corresponds to the percentage point 
change in SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. 
innovation in the FOMC forecast. 
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Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR in which 
SPF and FOMC forecasts are for real GDP. The dotted 
lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The 
impulse response corresponds to the percentage point 
change in SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. 
innovation in the FOMC forecast. 
Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR with final 
data for inflation and real GDP (solid blue line). The 
dashed lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The 
long-dash-dotted red line represents the SPF response 
based on the benchmark VAR with semester average 
data, and the dash-dotted lines the associated 90% 
confidence intervals. The long-dashed grey line 
represents the SPF response based on the benchmark 
VAR. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in SPF forecasts, in response to 
a one-S.D. innovation in the FOMC forecast.   23
























Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence 
intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in inflation, real GDP 
and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast.   24

























Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets. The dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-
month LIBOR) interest rates and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in 
the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure 7 – Fed rate shock – Benchmark VAR  










































Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR. The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change 
in inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed 
rate. 
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Figure 8 – Fed rate shock – Alternative benchmark VAR  









































Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets. The dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-
month LIBOR) interest rates and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the 
Fed rate. 
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Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks 
in the case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP. The second line displays 
the equivalent responses in the case of the alternative VAR with long-term rates and 
LIBOR. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 10 – Fed rate (left column) and FOMC forecast (right column) responses  
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Semesters  
Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR. The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in 
the Fed rate and FOMC forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in inflation, real 
GDP and SPF forecasts. 
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Figure 11 – Fed rate (left column) and FOMC forecast (right column) responses  
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Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets. The dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in the Fed rate and FOMC forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. 
innovation in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-month LIBOR) 




Figure A.1 – All orderings – Objective variables VAR 
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Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR and models 2-7. The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The blue line is for benchmark VAR, maroon for model 2, green for model 3, 
orange for model 4, grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold for model 7. The impulse response 
corresponds to the percentage point change in inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, in response 
to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.2 - All orderings – Intermediate targets VAR 
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Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets and models 12-17. The 
dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The blue line is for benchmark VAR, 
maroon for model 12, green for model 13, orange for model 14, grey for model 15, red for 
model 16 and gold for model 17. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point 
change in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-month LIBOR) interest 
rates and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC 
forecast. 
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Figure A.3 - All orderings – 
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Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks in the 
case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP. The second line displays the 
equivalent responses in the case of a VAR with Long-term rates and LIBOR. On the first line, the 
blue line is for benchmark VAR, maroon for model 2, green for model 3, orange for model 4, 
grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold for model 7. On the second line, the dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The blue line is for the alternative VAR, maroon for 
model 12, green for model 13, orange for model 14, grey for model 15, red for model 16 and gold 
for model 17. 
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Figure A.4 – Structural vs. Reduced-form – Objectives variables VAR 
















































Note: Estimates based on the benchmark structural VAR (blue line). The dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The red line represents the SPF response based on the 
reduced-form VAR and the dash-dotted lines the associated 90% confidence intervals. The 
impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in inflation, real GDP and SPF 
forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.5 – Structural vs. Reduced-form – Intermediate targets VAR 





































Note: Estimates based on the benchmark structural VAR (blue line). The dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The red line represents the SPF response based 
on the reduced-form VAR and the dash-dotted lines the associated 90% confidence 
intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in long-term 
(10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-month LIBOR) interest rates and SPF 
forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.6 – Structural vs. Reduced-form -   





























Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks in the 
case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP. The second line displays the equivalent 
responses in the case of a VAR with Long-term rates and LIBOR. Estimates based on the benchmark 
structural VAR (blue line). The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The red line 
represents the SPF response based on the reduced-form VAR and the dash-dotted lines the 
associated 90% confidence intervals. 
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Figure A.7 –Objectives variables VAR with 1 lag 























































Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR and models 2-7, all with 1 lag. The dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The blue line is for benchmark VAR, maroon for model 2, 
green for model 3, orange for model 4, grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold for model 7. 
The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in inflation, real GDP and SPF 
forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.8 – Intermediate targets VAR with 1 lag 




















































Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets and models 12-17, all 
with 1 lag. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The blue line is for benchmark 
VAR, maroon for model 12, green for model 13, orange for model 14, grey for model 15, red for 
model 16 and gold for model 17. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point 
change in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-month LIBOR) interest rates 
and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.9 – VAR with 1 lag 



































Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks in the 
case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP. The second line displays the 
equivalent responses in the case of a VAR with Long-term rates and LIBOR. On the first line, the 
blue line is for benchmark VAR, maroon for model 2, green for model 3, orange for model 4, 
grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold for model 7. On the second line, the dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The blue line is for the alternative VAR, maroon for 
model 12, green for model 13, orange for model 14, grey for model 15, red for model 16 and gold 
for model 17. 
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Figure A.10 – Small sample estimator - Objectives variables VAR 























































Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR and models 2-7, all with the small sample 
estimator. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The blue line is for 
benchmark VAR, maroon for model 2, green for model 3, orange for model 4, grey for model 5, 
red for model 6 and gold for model 7. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage 
point change in inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the 
Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.11 – Small sample estimator – Intermediate targets VAR 




















































Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets and models 12-17, all 
with the small sample estimator. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The 
blue line is for benchmark VAR, maroon for model 12, green for model 13, orange for model 14, 
grey for model 15, red for model 16 and gold for model 17. The impulse response corresponds to 
the percentage point change in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-month 
LIBOR) interest rates and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or 
the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.12 – Small sample estimator –  






































Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks in the 
case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP. The second line displays the 
equivalent responses in the case of a VAR with Long-term rates and LIBOR. They are estimated 
with a small sample estimator. On the first line, the blue line is for benchmark VAR, maroon for 
model 2, green for model 3, orange for model 4, grey for model 5, red for model 6 and gold for 
model 7. On the second line, the dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The blue 
line is for the alternative VAR, maroon for model 12, green for model 13, orange for model 14, 
grey for model 15, red for model 16 and gold for model 17. 
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Figure A.13 – FOMC_FR - Objectives variables VAR 























































Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR with the mid-point of the central tendency (blue 
line). The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The red line represents the SPF 
response based on the benchmark VAR with the mid-point of the full range and the dash-dotted 
lines the associated 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. 
innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.14 – FOMC_FR – Intermediate targets VAR 


























































Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR with the mid-point of the central tendency (blue 
line). The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The red line represents the SPF 
response based on the benchmark VAR with the mid-point of the full range and the dash-dotted 
lines the associated 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-month 
LIBOR) interest rates and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the 
FOMC forecast. 
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Figure A.15 – FOMC_FR –  



































Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks in the 
case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP. The second line displays the equivalent 
responses in the case of a VAR with Long-term rates and LIBOR. Estimates based on the 
benchmark VAR with the mid-point of the central tendency (blue line). The dotted lines represent 
the 90% confidence intervals. The red line represents the SPF response based on the benchmark 
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Figure A.16 – Real GDP forecasts – Benchmark VAR –  
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Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR. The dotted lines represent the 90% 
confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the percentage point change in 
inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or 
the FOMC forecast.   46
Figure A.17 – Real GDP forecasts – Alternative Benchmark VAR – 
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Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets. The dotted lines 
represent the 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds to the 
percentage point change in long-term (10-year Treasury bonds) and short-term (US 3-
month LIBOR) interest rates and SPF forecasts, in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the 
Fed rate or the FOMC forecast.   47
Figure A.18 – Real GDP forecasts – 
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Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks in the 
case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP. The second line displays the 
equivalent responses in the case of the alternative VAR with long-term rates and LIBOR. The 
dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals.   48
Figure A.19 – Final data – 



















Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR with final data for inflation and real GDP. 
The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response corresponds 
to the percentage point change in inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, in response to a 
one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast.   49
Figure A.20 – Semester Average Data – Benchmark VAR –  

























Note: Estimates based on the benchmark VAR with semester average data. The 
dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The impulse response 
corresponds to the percentage point change in inflation, real GDP and SPF forecasts, 
in response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast.   50
Figure A.21 – Semester Average Data – Alternative Benchmark VAR – 
























Note: Estimates based on the alternative VAR with intermediate targets and semester 
average data. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. The impulse 
response corresponds to the percentage point change in long-term (10-year Treasury 
bonds) and short-term (US 3-month LIBOR) interest rates and SPF forecasts, in 
response to a one-S.D. innovation in the Fed rate or the FOMC forecast.   51
Figure A.22 – Semester Average Data – 
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Note: The first line displays the responses of FOMC and Fed rate to both monetary shocks in 
the case of the benchmark VAR with inflation and real GDP and with semester average data. 
The second line displays the equivalent responses in the case of the alternative VAR with long-
term rates and LIBOR. The dotted lines represent the 90% confidence intervals. 
 